Duke FLYERS ASSOCIATION NEWS

Number 10-2 **July 2010**

ALL DUKE FLIGHT PLANS LEAD TO WAUKESHA (UES)!



2010 FLY-IN

TIME TO SEND IN YOUR RESERVATIONS FOR THIS YEARS FLY-IN

WAUKESHA, WISCONSIN *September 23RD – 26TH*

PRESIDENT
Earle Olson
P-352

VICE PRESIDENT
Al Uhalt
P-548

NEWSLETTER
Jim Gorman
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SPARE PARTS FOR YOUR DUKE

(2) Generators	**(1) Tach Generator**
(2) Starters	**(2) Magnetos**
(2) Flap Motors	**(2) Landing Gear Motors**

Above are located at Aircraft Systems, 5187 Falcon Road, Rockford, IL 61109. They will ship item to you by UPS or Federal Express. You return your part (same day) to them. They will overhaul, charging your credit card for work done, and then item becomes Association emergency part. Phone 815-399-0225.

Cowl Flap Actuator	**A/C Door Actuator**
Electric Boost Pump	**Overhauled Turbo**
Exhaust Transition Pipe	**Oil Cooler (new - 4 in stock)**
Lycoming Exhaust Pipe #77429	**Engine Cylinder Assembly (2 in stock)**
Prop Brush 3E1206-2	**Prop Spinner (Less Back Plate)**
Recognition Bulbs DN25-5	

Above - contact Earle Olson @ P. O. Box 1043, Medina, OH 44258
Phone 330-723-3210 (O) 330-723-9977 (FAX)

WELCOME NEW MEMBERS

Roger Battiston
Land O'Lakes, FL

Rex Reynolds
Memphis, TN

Charles Henry
Seattle, WA

Brent Fox
Janesville, WI

Terry Chapman
Monroeville, AL

Brett Miller
San Diego, CA

Raymond Assmar P-555
Owensboro, KY

Robbie Robinson P-266
College Station, TX

Ronald Siegel P-432
Commack, NY

Marcus Pradel P-479
Boca Raton, FL

Edward Noakes III P-392
Poplar Grove, IL

Tom Kockinis P-108
Huntington Beach, CA

Kent Rhude P-443
Alpena, MI

Gregory Drake P-128
Pensacola, FL

Frank Scher P-432
Shoreham, NY

David Pye B36TC
Eagle Nest, NM

COMMENTS FROM: *EARLE OLSON, PRESIDENT*

July has arrived with the heat we have not missed. Remember hot weather brings with it diminished take off performance. Check your pressure altitude.

Good news, Jim Gorman, the keeper of our records, tells me we have had 23 new members this year compared to 22 all of last year. This brings us new opportunities to share our knowledge and experience so as to safely transition these members to the Duke.

Please read over Joe Konicki's report of his disastrous recurrent training accident. He has been kind enough to allow us to publish his report in the newsletter. Joe has been flying his Duke for many years and has contributed some helpful information on our website on several topics. His story is a must read and discuss review of when things can go bad and do. We will probably discuss this and some other never let it happen to you topics at the Waukesha Fly-In.

Gary Bongard reports that his source for windshields has dried up. PPG purchased the company he was getting them from and they are now available from Beech or Aviall.

We are still trying to see what we can do about the crush washer cost problem. This is a washer that is used on the lower wing bolt when you do the required five-year inspection. They have sky rocketed in price, and we are attempting to see if we can bring the price down.

It goes without saying that we are very troubled that two lives have been lost in two Dukes accidents this year to fatal accidents. We think it is time to have a review of best practices to try and stem this alarming problem. As I mentioned above, at the Waukesha Fly-In we will have a session on what can and will bite you regarding maintaining and operating your Duke. There is so much talent and experience in the DFA that if we just listen to those who have been there, we should be able to avoid the heartbrakes of this last year.

Our friend, Drew McEwen, has taken on new responsibilities for Beechcraft, and he is planning to bring our new contact at Beech to the Fly-In so you can meet him. We appreciate all Drew has done for us and the goodies he has supplied at the past Fly-Ins. We wish Drew the best in his new responsibilities.

We hope to set a new record for attendance in Waukesha with all our new members. Hope to see you there.

Earle

DUKE ACCIDENT

June 7, 2010, member Joe Konicki was on an instrument proficiency check ride. Here are his comments on the last takeoff:

All, I am doing well considering the circumstances. 1st degree burns to left half of face and neck, 2nd/3rd burns to hands and arms, cracked collar bone, four cracked ribs, both shoulders dislocated. Although the plane exploded on impact and was completely engulfed in fire, I was able to make it out the emergency escape hatch. Sadly I could not lift the instructor from off the floor and get him out—I believe he was already dead. Within seconds of my exit other fuel tanks began to explode. There is a video of the crash on the internet (it is linked to the Edenton Newspaper). It is from the airport security cam.

I was doing an ICC/IPC. We had been flying for about an hour, did an approach to landing and then set up for a more complex series of NAV exercises/approaches. He gave me my routing/clearance and I set up the nav systems. Went through pre-takeoff checklist, we were at 6100 lbs, fwd CG (10deg nose up trim), cowl flaps closed, AC off, 6000 ft runway, calm winds. P13 had VGs, winglets, tip tanks, strakes, intercoolers. As I taxied into position and prepared to depart instructor took control of the throttles. All I said was "OK" (mistake #1). Instructor and I had talked earlier in the day about poor accelerations and need for full pwr on takeoff. My technique was rotate at Vme=5 (83kts), pitch to about 10deg up, climb at 99kts (Vx) till about 200-300 ft then reduce pitch and get above Vy (112).

Instructor brought up power to about 28" and I released brakes. Accelerate-stop was about 3500-3600 and with a rolling takeoff (power being ramped up during the takeoff roll) figured 4000' was accelerate-stop. What I didn't consider was instructor ramped up power far slower than I ever did (mistake 2). He was bringing up power as we crossed 2000 ft mark. Near Vmc (78) he stopped adding power at 36"MP. I was about to say something when we hit 83kts, I called rotation and we lifted off feeding in right rudder (my plane always needed a good amt of right rudder in the climb if the yaw damper was off). I've taken off with 36" before by myself so I knew the plane would be slow, but do OK once I got the gear up. I glanced at the VSI looking for positive rate, we were maybe 50' high as I could just begin to see the tree tops, as soon as it moved I called "positive rate-gear up". Since my right hand was on the yoke I had to turn my head and look down for the gear handle, I had in my mind to say "I need 40"MP for the climb" as my fingers touched the gear handle. At that moment I saw a quick movement by the instructor's arms. I immediately went into disbelief "I thought to myself this plane can't climb at 36" on one engine and 85kts with the gear down". I looked up and the plane had rolled 10-15deg left, I pushed right rudder to the floor and it wasn't stopping the roll, I cranked in full aileron but we were stalling. I reached for the throttles but the instructor's hands were blocking me from moving them forward. The trees were only a few feet away I pushed the yoke forward to get more airspeed as I didn't want to crash sideways or upside down. The plane hit the trees with sickening "whump" and an immediate fireball.

Hopefully you all will never get yourself in this position as I did. When I gave up control of the throttles I lost control of the takeoff. In my mind this crash makes no sense. The instructor had 45,000 hours and had flown nearly everything multi-engine including Dukes. He did have some medical issues and it is my belief that he did not do this purposely. I think he had a medical episode during the takeoff which took P13 and me down with him. He never said a word during the takeoff or through crash and as far as I can tell he took no actions other than maybe falling over still grasping the throttles. Unfortunately the intense fire probably didn't leave enough for the medical examiners to sort that out.

Joe K's Crash Lessons Learned

I appreciate the calls, letters, and emails of support from the DFA members. While this is still fresh in my mind I wanted to tell you how I could have done things different, and maybe give you all some items to think about during your next instructional flight. Joe

JOE KONICKI'S KEY LESSONS LEARNED FROM CRASHING:

1—GIVING UP CONTROL OF THE THROTTLES ON TAKEOFF: The takeoff is one of the most critical operations of a multi-engine aircraft prone to disaster (others may be full stalls, Vmc demo, and landings). By giving up control of the throttles you give up control of aircraft's takeoff length, airspeed, climb rate, and possibly directional control. If throttles are to be given up, it is important to agree on what max throttle setting will be the target, how soon the throttles will be positioned to achieve that target, and the importance of maintaining equal thrust.

2—WHAT TO DO WITH THE PILOT'S RIGHT HAND: Since the instructor had put his hands on the throttles I put my right hand on the yoke. This felt odd to me and it took away the ability to reach the gear handle without looking. In order to reach the gear handle on this takeoff, I had to move my head down and to the side to look for it, because my hand was coming from an abnormal direction, and I had to keep my eyes focused on it as I reached towards it right at the exact moment the engine failure was initiated. This took precious time away from reacting to the roll over (at least half a second resulting in 10-15degrees of roll). Be aware of the pitfalls of flying with your hands/head in odd arrangements that have never been practiced on the ground. I didn't realize I'd have to put my head down until I had rotated the aircraft.

3—ACCESS TO THE THROTTLE QUADRANT: In the event of a simulated or actual there should be an agreement and understanding of how the pilot and instructor will position their hands to get access to the controls. I could not get access to the throttles, prop control or mixtures because the instructor's arms and hands were blocking same. The instructor may have had his hand jammed between the split position of the throttles.

4—AGREEING HOW AND WHEN A SIMULATED ENGINE OUT IS TO BE DEMONSTRATED: There are a number of ways of simulating or creating an engine out situation including reducing throttle, placing mixture in idle cutoff, or turning off a fuel selector. The most aggressive is to shut off fuel. The Beech flight manual has a paragraph on how to set zero thrust on a running engine. Elements of how high the plane ought to be how fast it ought to be and whether a real engine out exercise is going to be demonstrated should all be understood. I expected a retarded throttle somewhere between 500 and 1000 feet at airspeeds above 100kts and with the gear up. I did not expect an engine out at 50' 83-85kts with landing gear down and obstructions in every quadrant.

5—TAKING A PASSIVE ROLE: I'll be honest; I really wanted to get my IPC completed. It meant a lot to me because I was getting ready to fly extensively around the US and I'd be leaving at the end of the week. I had made up my mind that I had to have that sign off—and I was close, 75% complete with only maybe one more hour of flying. Couple this with a salty 69 year old 45,000 instructor pilot who asked a lot from his students and you arrive at a dominant (instructor) to passive (owner-pilot) relationship. I did everything he told me to do without challenging him and even when I was feeling bit uncomfortable I tried to find a way to accomplish what he asked without pushing back. When I did finally see a problem with the takeoff power setting I spent some time trying to phrase my request for more power in a polite manner so I wouldn't insult him. As it turned out I never got those words out of my mouth before the crash. Also, because he was the

only game in town, I didn't press him for his experience in the Duke. He mentioned he had flown one in the past and that was good enough for me, heck I was only trying to get an IPC signoff how bad could things get?

6—SAFETY PREPS: There were a few things which went right following the crash. First are seat belts. When I opened my eyes I reached down with my right hand and tried to unbuckle my seat belt. Why my right I don't know because I usually used my left. I couldn't unbuckle at first because I was trying to lift the wrong end. I needed both hands and a couple of attempts to unhook my seatbelt. In the reclined seating position I was in I couldn't look down and see the buckle, had to do it by feel. Suggest you and your frequent passengers practice unbuckling using opposite hands and without looking at the buckle. Since the aircraft spun 180 degrees clockwise in the air before hitting the ground, the plane impacted the ground tail first. The entire aft cabin was crumpled with parts of the headliner, wall panels, seat backs all a strew inside the cabin. In fact, the right engine was inside the cabin having detached and broken through where the copilot seat is located. There was smoke in the cabin and it was very dark although flames surrounded the plane and provided some illumination. I didn't make it back to the aft door, but it likely would not have opened given that it was dug into the ground about 6" and blocked by a large tree. The emergency exit however worked perfectly. Due to debris in the cabin and location of the middle seat "seat back" (being pushed aft by the engine) , I had to maneuver the hatch around debris and throw it outside the plane. I have to credit my IA here, John Layden. At every annual he made me demonstrate removal of that escape hatch. This past annual the hatch mechanism was showing some loose play (the plane was serial was P13 so no telling how many times it had been removed during its life). In order to replace the hardware and re-adjust the door to the airframe, I had to remove and install it maybe 8 or 10 times this past NOV. It was a pain, but the repetitions of doing that meant I was trained up on removing it by feel and I had full confidence in its operation. During the crash I still did it wrong the first time. I lifted the flat cover OK (and please ensure you have copper safety wire holding it in place which will break easily the first lift—you won't have time to screw around with it in an emergency if you have stainless lockwire or a heavy duty ziptie). I reached the red handle and pulled—nothing, no movement. Then I immediately remembered, oh yeah you have to press the grey thumb latch first. When I did that, poof the hatch popped loose perfectly. I had lost my glasses at impact, and in the smoke you can't see much and although there are letters on everything you won't have time to stop and read the instructions. I couldn't read the white letters on gray in the darkness. I suggest if you fly with wife, family, go ahead and have them pop that hatch out during your annual a couple of times to get comfortable with it. Have them operate the main cabin door latches too.

REMEMBER…If you make a change in your mailing address, you have 30 days to nullify FAA or you may not exercise the privileges of your certificate and may lose your N number and certificate of registration.